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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Murray Casey Carter appeals from the district court's orders denying his
Rule 35 motion and motion for the appointment of counsel.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The

state

charged

Carter

with

felony

eluding

a

police

officer,

misdemeanor DUI, and misdemeanor DWP. (R., pp.34-36.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Carter pied guilty to the eluding and DUI charges, and the state
dismissed the remaining charge and agreed to recommend a unified sentence of
five years, with two years fixed. (R., p.39.) The district court accepted Carter's
plea and imposed an aggregate unified sentence of five years, with one year
fixed.

(R., pp.48-53.)

Carter filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of

sentence and a motion for the appointment of counsel to represent him on the
Rule 35 motion.

(R., pp.68-71.) The district court denied both motions.

pp.79-85.) Carter timely appeals. (R., pp.57-59.)

1

(R.,

ISSUES
Carter states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it refused to appoint counsel
based on its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Carter's Rule 35
motion was frivolous?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Carter's Rule 35 motion under the mistaken belief that its
review power was limited to considering only the fixed
portion of his sentence?

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Carter failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for the appointment of counsel to pursue a frivolous Rule 35
motion?

2.

Has Carter failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying
his Rule 35 motion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Carter Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying
His Motion For Appointment Of Counsel To Pursue His Frivolous Rule 35 Motion

A.

Introduction
The district court denied Carter's application for the appointment of

counsel to represent him on his Rule 35 motion, finding the motion was frivolous.
(R., pp.79-80.) Carter argues the district court erred because, he contends, it
"based its decision on a misstatement of the facts, which led to its erroneous
conclusion that the Rule 35 motion, which was supported by new information,
was frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Carter's argument fails. The record does
not support Carter's claim that the district court misstated the facts; even if it did,
the misstatement is immaterial because correct application of the law to the facts
alleged by Carter in his Rule 35 motion supports the court's ultimate conclusion
that the motion was frivolous and, therefore, Carter was not entitled to appointed
counsel to pursue it.

B.

Standard Of Review
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(2)(c) 1 is "within the

court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims
presented are frivolous."

Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d

1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996) (addressing a post-conviction proceeding and not

1

Prior to July 2013, the statutory provision for the appointment of counsel in
post-conviction proceedings was codified at I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). Effective July
2013, that provision was re-designated as I.C. § 19-852(2)(c). See 2013 Idaho
Sess. Laws, ch. 220, § 2, p.515.
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a Rule 35 motion).

"A determination of whether a motion for reduction of

sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19-852[(2)(c)] is ... one of
law which [the appellate court] freely review[s]." State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522,
526, 873 P.2d 167, 171 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

Carter Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ultimate
Conclusion That Carter's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel at all stages of the

criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion.

Murray v. State, 121

Idaho 918, 923 n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992). However, the
court may deny appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one
that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at
his or her own expense.

I.C. § 19-852(2)(c).

A determination of whether a

motion for reduction of sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19852(2)(c) is based on the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying
documentation that may support the motion. Wade, 125 Idaho at 525, 873 P.2d
at 170.

Any colorable merit to a Rule 35 motion must arise from new or

additional information that would create a basis for reduction of the sentence.

kl

A district court acts within its discretion in denying a request for court appointed
counsel under I.C. § 19-852(2)(c) if the court appropriately finds that the claims
presented are frivolous after reviewing the contents of the motion. Swisher, 129
Idaho at 468-69, 926 P.2d at 1315-16.
Carter's Rule 35 motion sought a reduction of the indeterminate portion of
his sentence from four years to two years. (R., pp.62-64.) As the bases for his
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request, Carter asserted he never intended to elude a police officer, that he only
did so because he was impaired, and that he was sorry "for not being observant
of the officer." (R., p.63.) He also claimed to be "attending AA-NA meetings and
Celbrat[ing] Recovery" while awaiting enrollment in the Therapeutic Community
program at the prison. (R., p.64.) The district court deemed Carter's Rule 35
motion frivolous and, therefore, declined to appoint counsel, reasoning:
In this case, the Court sentenced Carter on January 8, 2014,
for Count I. Eluding a Police Officer, Felony, I.C. § 49-1401 and
Count II. Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of
Alcohol (Second Within Ten Years), Misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 188004, -8005(4). Carter complains about both the indeterminate
portion of four (4) years on Count I and one (1) year on Count II,
each count running concurrently; Defendant wants the Court to
reduce his indeterminate time to two (2) years.
There was a plea agreement for two (2) years fixed, with
three (3) years indeterminate on Count I; the Court actually
reduced the fixed time to one (1) year.
In his Motion, he argues his sentence should be reduced to
one (1) year, with two (2) years fixed [sic]. Based on all of this, the
Court finds that the Motion "is not a proceeding that a reasonable
person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own
expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding." I.C. § 19852(b )(3). [2]
Therefore, the Court denies appointment of counsel to assist
in pursuing a Rule 35 motion, because it finds the Motion to be
frivolous.
(R., pp.79-80 (underlining original).)
Carter challenges the district court's determination that his Rule 35 motion
was frivolous, arguing the court based that determination on an erroneous belief
that the plea agreement "include[d] a provision that he and the State would jointly

2

See footnote 1, supra.
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recommend a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed" when,
"[i]nstead, it provided that the State would cap its recommendation at no more
than five years, with two years fixed, with Mr. Carter free to argue for probation."
(Appellant's brief, p.5 (transcript citations omitted).) Carter's argument fails for
two reasons. First, the district court did not find that the plea agreement called
for a "joint" sentencing recommendation of two years fixed, with three years
indeterminate. (See R., p.80.) Second, even if such finding could be inferred
from court's order, such is not a basis for reversal because a review of the
record, including the contents of Carter's Rule 35 motion, supports the court's
ultimate legal conclusion that the motion was frivolous and, therefore, Carter was
not entitled to the appointment of counsel to pursue it. See Wade, 125 Idaho at
526, 873 P.2d at 171 (determination of whether Rule 35 motion is frivolous is
question of law).
The district court accurately summarized the facts giving rise to Carter's
convictions in this case, as follows:
This incident began . . . when Carter broke out the rear
window of his girlfriend's car and called and threatened to kill her.
He had previously threatened her. He then drove to another
house. He was extremely intoxicated and the police went to
investigate. He spilled beer all over himself. He threatened to
shoot another woman who was answering a call from his girlfriend.
He then offered another person $1000 to beat up his girlfriend.
The officer located him driving and Carter refused to stop and fled.
He drove on Deer Flat Road from Linder Road at speeds of
approximately 80 m.p.h. He failed to negotiate a right turn as he
attempted to head south on Eagle Road causing his car to run over
a stop sign and slide off the road. His blood alcohol was .135/.116.
He put a number of people at risk.
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(R., pp.83-84; see also PSI, pp.3, 19, 23, 25-27, 34-35.) The eluding charge in

this case was Carter's second felony conviction, and the DUI and DWP were his
sixth and seventh misdemeanor convictions. (R., p.84; see also PSI, pp.4-5, 50,
52-53.) Carter also has an extensive juvenile record. (R., p.84; see also PSI,
p.52.)

The district court considered the nature of the crimes and Carter's

character extensively in sentencing and, although it did not grant Carter's request
for probation, it did impose a lesser sentence than that recommended by the
state so that Carter would be immediately eligible for the "intensive treatment"
provided through the prison's rehabilitative Therapeutic Community program.
(Tr., p.38, L.17 - p.44, L.24.)
Carter's Rule 35 motion was not supported by any new information that
would have warranted a reduction of his sentence.

As noted above, Carter

asserted in the motion that he did not intend to elude the police, that he only did
so because he was impaired, and that he was sorry for having done so. (R.,
p.63.) All of this information was before the district court at the time it sentenced
Carter (see PSI, pp.3-4; Tr., p.33, Ls.1-14, p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.11, p.38, Ls.816), and the court specifically took into account the circumstances of the crime
and Carter's purported remorse in fashioning an appropriate sentence (see Tr.,
p.39, L.4 - p.41, L.20). Thus, the only arguably new information in the motion
was Carter's self-serving claim, unsupported by any documentation, that he was
"attending

AA-NA meetings

and

Celebrat[ing]

Recovery"

while

awaiting

enrollment in the prison's Therapeutic Community program. (R., p.64.) None of
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this information had any chance of convincing the district court that Carter's
sentence should be reduced.
The district court was aware when it sentenced Carter that he had
previously had the benefit of substance abuse treatment, but such treatment had
not "accomplished anything" and Carter still remained a "high risk" to reoffend.
(Tr., p.39, Ls.4-11; PSI, pp.5, 10.) The court also clearly anticipated that Carter
would

participate in rehabilitative programming while incarcerated, as it

specifically formulated Carter's sentence to facilitate his ability to get the
"intensive treatment" the court deemed necessary before Carter could be safely
released to the community.

(Tr., p.42, L.18 - p.44, L.24.)

Although it is

commendable that Carter was participating in available rehabilitative programs
while awaiting the intensive treatment envisioned by the district court, in light of
the nature of the crimes he committed, his past record, and his past failed
rehabilitation attempts, such efforts by Carter did not rise to the level of showing
the motion was not frivolous for purposes of appointing counsel at government
expense. See Wade, 125 Idaho at 525, 873 P.2d at 170 (any colorable merit to
a Rule 35 motion must arise from new or additional information that would create
a basis for reduction of the sentence).
The record supports the district court's ultimate conclusion that Carter's
Rule 35 motion was frivolous. Carter has therefore failed to establish the court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for the appointment of counsel to
pursue it.
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11.
Carter Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying
His Frivolous Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
Carter challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion, arguing the district

court abused its discretion "because it mistakenly believed that its review of its
original sentencing decision was limited to the fixed portion of the sentence."
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) Carter's claim of error is without factual or legal support;
he has therefore failed to show the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Carter must "show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." lg_,_

C.

Carter Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His
Rule 35 Motion
For all of the reasons set forth in Section I.C., supra, and incorporated by

reference herein, Carter has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that his
unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, is excessive in light of any of
the information he provided to the district court in support of his Rule 35 motion.
Carter does not contend otherwise. Instead, he argues the district court abused
its discretion by limiting its review of its original sentencing decision to only the
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fixed portion of the sentence. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) A review of the record and
of the applicable law shows Carter is incorrect.
It is well settled that, in reviewing a sentence, the reviewing court
presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable
term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391
(2007). The district court recognized as much in its order denying Carter's Rule
35 motion. (See R., p.83 ("The fixed portion of a sentence imposed under the
Unified Sentencing Act is treated as the term of confinement for sentence review
purposes." (Citation omitted).) Although the court expressly found that Carter's
"one-year fixed sentence for Eluding" was "lenient considering the facts of this
crime and is well within the statutory sentence guidelines" (Id.), there is no
indication that the court strictly limited its review to only the fixed portion of
Carter's sentence. To the contrary, the district court specifically recognized that
Carter was seeking a reduction of the indeterminate portion of his sentence from
four to two years, and it denied that request based on a number of factors including the nature of the crime and Carter's character, criminal history and
demonstrated need for treatment - that "suggested the need" for that sentence.
(R., pp.82-84.)

The record thus belies Carter's claim that the district court

applied an incorrect legal standard.
Having failed to demonstrate from the record that the district court applied
an incorrect legal standard, and having failed to even argue, much less
demonstrate, that his sentence is excessive in light of the information he
provided to the district court in support of his Rule 35 motion, Carter has failed to
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establish the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for
leniency.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders denying Carter's Rule 35 motion and his motion for the appointment of
counsel.
th

DATED this 8 day of October 2014.

I A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Gen

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of October 2014, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

RI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Gen
LAF/pm
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